For most citizens, the Election Commission of India appears as a single institution. Orders are issued in the name of the Commission, election schedules are announced by the Commission, electoral rolls are revised under its authority, and its decisions carry enormous constitutional weight. But the Election Commission is not a one-person office. It is a multi-member constitutional body, and the law governing its functioning specifically provides for collective decision-making.

That is why an investigation published by The Indian Express on September 23, 2026, has raised an important institutional question. According to the newspaper, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded objections at least 14 times over a period of 10 months to decisions, orders or administrative steps that they said had been taken without their knowledge or approval. Four of those objections, according to the investigation, came on a single day.¹

The issues were not peripheral matters. They involved registration of new voters, deletion and restoration of names, changes connected with Form 6, appeals concerning entries in electoral rolls, control over voter-roll software and the powers of statutory electoral officers in the States. The newspaper also reported that both Commissioners separately approached Cabinet Secretary T V Somanathan when an internal work-allocation decision affected oversight of the Election Commission’s information-technology systems.¹ ³

The Election Commission has rejected the suggestion that these internal objections demonstrate that its final decisions were not collective. In its response after publication of the investigation, the Commission said that individual observations, operational queries and suggestions during deliberations are a normal part of institutional functioning. It maintained that all final decisions taken by the full Commission during the period, including those relating to the Special Intensive Revision, were unanimous.⁷

This creates an important distinction. The question is not simply whether Sandhu and Joshi ever disagreed with Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. Disagreement inside a constitutional body is neither unusual nor automatically problematic. The more consequential question raised by the documents reported by The Indian Express is whether particular instructions, communications and operational changes were implemented in the Commission’s name before the three-member Commission had collectively approved them.

The 14 Objections Were Connected to the Heart of the Electoral-Roll System

The Special Intensive Revision, or SIR, began in Bihar in June 2025 and was subsequently expanded across much of the country. The Indian Express reported that more than 13 crore names were left out of draft electoral rolls across 30 States and Union Territories during the exercise.¹

That figure requires an important qualification. A name being absent from a draft roll is not automatically the same as a final and permanent deletion. Election Commission procedures provide for publication of draft rolls followed by a claims-and-objections period, hearings and eventual publication of final electoral rolls. Official ECI instructions expressly provide for such a process.⁵

Even with that distinction, the scale of the revision makes the reported internal objections significant. They touched upon the mechanisms through which a citizen enters the electoral roll, remains on it, challenges a deletion, or is restored after being removed.

The controversy can broadly be understood through four areas: Form 6 and registration of new voters, centralisation of electoral-roll software, deletion and restoration of voters, and the procedure through which decisions were issued in the name of the Election Commission itself.

Form 6: Can a Statutory Voter-Registration Form Be Changed Administratively?

One of the clearest disagreements concerned Form 6, the statutory form used by eligible citizens seeking registration as voters.

According to The Indian Express, the online Form 6 process began asking applicants whether they, their parents or their grandparents appeared in the electoral roll prepared during the previous intensive revision. Although the additional section was not itself marked mandatory, applicants reportedly could not complete the online submission without answering it.²

Vivek Joshi’s Objection

Election Commissioner Vivek Joshi had reportedly recorded an objection on May 16. His position, according to the report, was that Form 6 and Form 8 are forms prescribed through the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and therefore could not simply be modified through an administrative SIR instruction.

The report says Joshi argued that if Form 6 had to be altered, the legally appropriate method would be to amend the relevant Rules through the competent authority. Election Commissioner Sukhbir Singh Sandhu reportedly concurred with this position on May 19.²

Sandhu Later Called the Change “Unauthorised” and “Illegal”

Despite those objections, the additional declaration appeared on the ECINet portal.

On August 13, according to The Indian Express, Sandhu again put his objection on record, describing the change as “unauthorised” and “illegal” and calling for its removal so that eligible young and first-time voters would not face unnecessary difficulty.¹ ²

The significance of the dispute goes beyond the wording of one form. Electoral-registration forms form part of a statutory framework. If an administrative portal effectively adds a new condition or declaration to a statutory form, the legal question becomes one of authority as well as convenience.

The Election Commission’s response is that individual observations made while policy or implementation is being developed do not themselves constitute final Commission decisions. The unresolved issue, therefore, is whether the disputed Form 6 requirement represented an interim implementation step subsequently approved by the Commission, or whether an operational requirement was imposed despite the objections recorded by two Commissioners.⁷


Editorial illustration showing an Electoral Registration Officer attempting to restore a voter while access to the centrally administered ECINet electoral-roll database is restricted.
The dispute over ECINet raises an institutional question about how statutory authority held by Electoral Registration Officers interacts with centrally controlled electoral-roll software


The Deeper Issue: Who Actually Controls the Electoral-Roll Database?

A second and potentially more consequential disagreement involved the Commission’s digital infrastructure.

Electoral rolls are administered through Electoral Registration Officers, or EROs, appointed for constituencies. These officers deal with claims, objections, additions and deletions under the statutory electoral-registration framework.

As electoral-roll administration has become increasingly digital, systems such as ERONet and subsequently ECINet have become central to how these decisions are recorded and implemented.

ECINet was launched as an integrated election platform bringing together dozens of previously separate election-related applications and services.³

Joshi Warned About “Gradual Centralisation”

According to the Indian Express investigation, Joshi raised concerns in May about what he described as the “gradual centralisation” of the electoral-roll database.

He proposed an audit to verify that only the statutory authorities legally empowered to alter voter records possessed the credentials necessary to make such changes. He also reportedly suggested independent technical scrutiny involving experts from institutions such as the IITs.¹ ³

Sandhu Questioned Restrictions on State Officials

Sandhu subsequently recorded that officials at the State level had complained that they did not have proper and complete access to ERONet.

He questioned whether officials in the Election Commission’s IT division could restrict the operational access of statutory authorities who were legally responsible for maintenance of electoral rolls.¹

This is where what appears to be a technical disagreement becomes an institutional question.

If the law empowers an ERO to determine whether a citizen should be included in an electoral roll, but the digital system does not permit the officer to implement that decision, then practical control may no longer rest entirely with the statutory officer.

That does not automatically demonstrate manipulation. Restrictions on database access can serve legitimate purposes including cybersecurity, prevention of unauthorised alteration, auditability and protection of voter data. The Election Commission has itself defended ECINet's security architecture on those grounds.⁷

The question raised by the Commissioners' reported objections is narrower: whether technical controls altered the practical distribution of authority prescribed by electoral law.

Goa: When EROs Reportedly Could Not Restore 97 Eligible Voters

The Goa episode reported by The Indian Express illustrates why control of electoral software matters.

According to the investigation, EROs in Goa examined cases involving voters flagged because of what were described as “logical discrepancies”. After examining the documents submitted by those voters, the EROs reportedly found 97 persons eligible for inclusion in the final electoral roll

However, the software reportedly did not provide the officers with the necessary facility to reverse the earlier deletion.

Between February 11 and February 17, according to the report, the office of Goa’s Chief Electoral Officer repeatedly requested that the required rollback facility be enabled. The newspaper reported that this was not done before publication of the final roll, leaving the 97 voters outside the final electoral roll at that stage.¹

Ninety-seven voters are a very small number in an electorate approaching a billion voters. Institutionally, however, the example matters because it illustrates the distinction between legal authority and technological capability.

If a statutory officer concludes that a citizen satisfies the requirements for inclusion but cannot enter that conclusion into the electoral database, the software itself becomes part of the effective decision-making process.

West Bengal: Who Authorised Appeals Against Inclusion of Voters?

The West Bengal phase of the SIR became one of the most contested portions of the nationwide exercise, eventually involving extensive litigation and judicial supervision.

According to figures reported before the Supreme Court, more than 38 lakh appeals were connected with the West Bengal SIR process. Of these, around 22.21 lakh were filed by deleted voters seeking restoration, while another 16.10 lakh challenged the inclusion of voters

It was the second category that reportedly prompted Sandhu to seek answers internally.

Sandhu Asked Who Had Authorised the Appeals

According to the Indian Express investigation, Sandhu asked officials who had authorised appeals filed in the name of the Election Commission against voters whom judicial officers had allowed to remain on the electoral roll.

He also asked who had actually filed those appeals.

The report states that Sandhu recorded that neither he, Vivek Joshi, nor the then Chief Electoral Officer of West Bengal had been informed about the basis or procedure through which the appeals were initiated.¹

This does not, by itself, establish that the appeals were legally improper. Electoral law provides mechanisms through which inclusion or deletion decisions can be challenged.

The institutional question is different: if an appeal is being pursued in the name of the Election Commission of India, what level of approval is required before the Commission's name and authority can be used?

That question becomes particularly important when two of the three members reportedly say they were unaware of the process.

April Notes Raised a More Fundamental Procedural Question

The investigation also reported internal correspondence that went directly to the way decisions and communications were being issued.

Sandhu’s April 16 Communication

On April 16, Sandhu reportedly told senior officials that communications were being issued in the name of the Election Commission without approval of the Commission itself and that communications issued in the Commission's name should comply with the procedure required under the 2023 Act.¹

Joshi Raised a Similar Concern Eight Days Later

Eight days later, according to the newspaper, Joshi recorded a similar concern and said communications being disseminated in the ECI's name should receive the requisite approval of the Commission in accordance with Article 324 and the governing law.¹

This distinction is important.

There is a substantial difference between a Commissioner saying, “I disagree with a decision taken by the Commission,” and a Commissioner effectively saying, “I did not know that this decision or communication was being issued in the Commission’s name.”

The first is ordinary institutional disagreement. The second raises a procedural question about how institutional authority is being exercised.

What the Law Says About the Three-Member Election Commission

The legal framework governing the Election Commission does not treat the Chief Election Commissioner as someone who can simply override the other two Election Commissioners on matters requiring a decision of the Commission.

Section 18 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 states that the Election Commission may regulate its procedure and allocation of business by unanimous decision.

More importantly, Section 18(2) requires that Commission business should, as far as possible, be conducted unanimously. Where the Chief Election Commissioner and the other Election Commissioners differ, the matter is to be decided according to the majority view.⁶

In a three-member Commission, therefore, the existence of the position of Chief Election Commissioner does not convert the institution into a single-member executive authority.

The number 14 is consequently less important than the character of those objections.

A multi-member constitutional institution can contain frequent disagreements without becoming dysfunctional. Indeed, disagreement may demonstrate that internal scrutiny is functioning.

The significant issue is whether, after disagreement arose, the matter was ultimately handled through the collective procedure prescribed by law.


The Cabinet Secretary Episode Raises Another Institutional Question

One of the most unusual episodes reported by The Indian Express concerned oversight of the Commission’s information-technology division.

When an officer holding additional administrative charge reportedly changed allocation of work in a manner that removed an existing layer of supervision over the IT division, both Sandhu and Joshi objected.

According to the investigation, on July 29 the two Election Commissioners separately wrote to Cabinet Secretary T V Somanathan regarding the issue. They subsequently acted to restore the earlier arrangement until the full Commission could deal with the matter.³

The reported episode matters for two reasons.

First, the differences were not limited to a single voter-registration form or one State. They extended to the institutional structure supervising the digital systems through which electoral rolls are administered.

Second, two Election Commissioners separately approaching the Cabinet Secretary about an internal Election Commission administrative issue suggests that, at least from their perspective, the matter had reached a level where ordinary internal handling was insufficient.

The Indian Express reported that all three Commissioners subsequently met on September 9, which the newspaper described as their first full meeting in four months.¹

The Election Commission’s Response: Internal Views Are Not Final Decisions

Any assessment of the controversy must also include the Election Commission’s response.

Following publication of the investigation, the ECI said that differing observations, operational queries and suggestions from members of a multi-member constitutional body form part of normal institutional deliberation.

The Commission's position is that focusing on selected internal notes over a ten-month period presents only part of the institutional record.

Most importantly, the Election Commission has stated that all final decisions of the full Commission during the period, including decisions connected with the SIR, were unanimous.⁷

That defence introduces an important distinction between three stages of institutional functioning: an individual Commissioner’s observation, an administrative action or draft proposal, and a formally approved decision of the Election Commission.

Those things are not necessarily identical.

If Sandhu or Joshi objected to a proposal and that proposal was subsequently modified before receiving unanimous approval, the objection would demonstrate internal scrutiny rather than institutional breakdown.

If, however, a direction or administrative action was implemented in the name of the Election Commission before receiving the approval required under the Commission’s collective decision-making process, then a different institutional question arises.

The Indian Express investigation reports examples that it argues fall into the latter category. The Election Commission emphasises that its eventual decisions were unanimous.

What the Investigation Establishes, and What It Does Not

The reporting establishes that Sandhu and Joshi repeatedly recorded concerns relating to electoral-roll administration, Form 6, database access, voter-restoration issues, appeals and Commission procedure.

It also establishes, according to the documents reviewed by The Indian Express, that there were occasions when the two Commissioners believed actions had occurred without their knowledge or despite concerns they had placed on record.¹

The Election Commission has not argued that Commissioners can never express differing views. Its response instead emphasises that such views form part of the deliberative process and that the eventual decisions of the Commission were unanimous.⁷

What the investigation does not independently establish is that a political party directed the disputed actions, that every voter excluded during the SIR was wrongly excluded, or that the reported internal disagreements automatically invalidate electoral rolls or election results.

Those conclusions would require separate evidence and, where legal validity is challenged, findings by the appropriate courts.

The attached narration presents the issue more directly as one requiring an explanation from Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar. The documents reported by The Indian Express certainly make the CEC's role relevant because the objections were reportedly copied to him and related to actions undertaken within the Commission he headed. But institutional responsibility and a proven finding of individual wrongdoing are not the same thing.

That distinction is important in examining a constitutional institution.

The Real Question Is Not Whether Commissioners Disagreed

Much of the political discussion following the report has understandably concentrated on the existence of disagreement within the Election Commission.

But disagreement itself is not the core issue.

Three Commissioners need not think alike. In fact, the 2023 law expressly anticipates disagreement by providing that matters on which the Commissioners differ are to be determined by majority opinion.⁶

The more important question is whether the processes followed after disagreement emerged complied with that framework.

If two Commissioners objected to a proposed action, was the issue placed before the three-member Commission?

If the three members disagreed, was a formal decision taken?

If a decision was unanimous, is there an institutional record showing how the objections were resolved?

If an action was already implemented before that process occurred, under whose authority was it implemented?

These are procedural questions rather than partisan ones, and they are capable of documentary answers.

Transparency Can Resolve Much of the Controversy

The controversy therefore need not remain a contest between political accusations on one side and institutional assurances on the other.

The Election Commission could clarify which of the 14 reported objections related only to preliminary proposals and which involved actions that had already been implemented.

It could explain whether those matters were subsequently placed before all three Commissioners, whether any of the disputed steps were modified or withdrawn, and how unanimous approval was ultimately reached where the Commission says such approval existed.

Similarly, greater clarity could be provided about whether the Form 6 changes received the necessary statutory authority, what level of access EROs and State election authorities possess within ECINet, who authorised the disputed West Bengal appeals, and what technological safeguards ensure that software restrictions cannot prevent statutory officers from implementing legally valid decisions.

The Election Commission has defended ECINet's security architecture by saying that controls, audits and access restrictions are necessary to protect electoral data against unauthorised manipulation.⁷

That is a legitimate institutional concern.

But security and statutory authority are separate questions. A secure database must still allow officials who possess lawful decision-making powers to exercise those powers through the system.

Electoral Credibility Depends on Process as Much as Outcome

The Election Commission occupies an unusual position in Indian democracy.

Political parties contest elections. Governments change. Candidates win and lose. Election strategies and alliances change continuously. The institution administering those elections, however, must retain credibility irrespective of which party is in power or opposition.

That credibility depends not only on the outcome of an election but also on whether the processes leading to that outcome are demonstrably consistent with law.

This is why the reported objections deserve examination without automatically converting them either into proof of wrongdoing or dismissing them as routine bureaucratic correspondence.

The documents reported by The Indian Express concern matters at the centre of electoral administration: who becomes a voter, who remains a voter, who can restore a voter, who controls the database containing the electoral roll, and who has the authority to issue instructions in the name of the Election Commission of India.

These questions deserve documentary answers.

Fourteen Objections Matter Because Two of Three Commissioners Raised Them

The significance of the Indian Express investigation ultimately lies not merely in the number fourteen.

It lies in the fact that two members of a three-member constitutional body repeatedly considered certain issues important enough to place their objections formally on record

That does not establish that those Commissioners were correct on every point. Nor does it establish that the Chief Election Commissioner acted unlawfully. The Election Commission has expressly stated that all of its final decisions were unanimous.⁷

But those two facts can coexist only if the institutional process between objection and final approval is understood.

If the objections were considered, discussed and resolved before final decisions were taken unanimously, disclosure of that process would strengthen the Commission's response.

If some disputed measures were implemented before collective approval and later corrected, explaining that sequence would also clarify the record.

Either way, transparency would provide a more durable answer than competing political claims.

For an institution entrusted with administering the democratic right to vote, the question is not merely whether it says that it acted collectively. The stronger institutional standard is whether the sequence of proposal, objection, deliberation, authority and final decision can itself withstand public scrutiny.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

References

  1. Ritika Chopra, The Indian Express, “14 times in 10 months, two Election Commissioners objected on record to poll panel steps”, September 23, 2026. Read the Indian Express investigation
  2. Ritika Chopra, The Indian Express, “‘Illegal, unauthorised’: Election Commissioners objected to Form 6 change”, September 23, 2026. Read the Form 6 investigation
  3. Ritika Chopra and Damini Nath, The Indian Express, “Election Commissioners knocked on Cabinet Secretary’s door over voter software integrity”, September 23, 2026. Read the ECINet investigation
  4. The Indian Express, reporting on West Bengal SIR appeals before the Supreme Court, September 2026.
  5. Election Commission of India, official Special Intensive Revision instructions and schedules concerning publication of draft rolls, claims and objections, hearings and final publication.
  6. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, Section 18, concerning transaction and disposal of Election Commission business.
  7. Election Commission of India response following the September 23, 2026 reports, stating that internal observations are part of institutional deliberation and that final Commission decisions were unanimous.